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Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War
A SYSTEMS LEVEL APPRAOCH
ALDO D. ABITBOL
University of Denver
M.A. Candidate, International Security
______________________________________________________________________________
The emergence of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations as regional powers and
future challengers to U.S. hegemony has been predicted by many, and is a topic of much debate
among the IR community today. Interestingly, three of these nations have warred against each
other in the past and, coincidentally or not, it was the nations that shared borders: India and
China and China and Russia. This paper attempts an in-depth case study of the 1962 Sino-Indian
conflict from an angle that differs from previous studies. Past explorations of this conflict have
focused on domestic or the psychological motivations of political leaders for this abrupt war, but
I will depart from these studies in assessing the conflict’s origin and exploring the reasons for its
short duration. Employing a neorealist systems-level approach, I will attempt to explain how the
structure of the international system both instigated the Sino-Indian confrontation and also
limited the extent of the engagement.
______________________________________________________________________________

Sun Zi once said, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors
go to war first and then seek to win” (Zi 1988, 20). This declaration applies to the Sino-Indian
Border War of 1962 fittingly because of the unprepared manner in which Jawaharlal Nehru
entered into armed conflict with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Prime Minister Nehru, in
a seemingly intractable diplomatic position authorized the use of force against PRC assets in
Ladakh, south of the McMahon Line, in order to defend his conception of Indian territorial
integrity on October 9, 1962 (Eekelen 1967, 114). The resulting response from the PRC was a
devastating counterattack on October 20, 1962 crushing the Indian military. A second Chinese
offensive began on November 16, 1962, completely defeating Indian forces in the region
(Vertzberger 1984, 66). On November 21, 1962 the PRC declared a unilateral ceasefire, and
withdrew 20 km behind the line of actual control represented in Figure 1. Afterwards, no further
military engagements ensued. In the aftermath of this limited war the PRC suffered 1,400
casualties in comparison with the Indian military’s 3,120 dead, 3,100 captured, and 1,000
wounded (Feng, Cheng, and Wortzel 2003, 188).
However, it is not the purpose of this paper to recount the battles or outcomes of the 1962
Sino-Indian War. What is to be analyzed here is the question: why did the war erupt? Why was
an ephemeral armed conflict necessary between China and India despite the peaceful settlement
of border issues with other nations bordering China? This question is perplexing considering
both the previously warm and amicable state of Sino-Indian relations, in addition to Zhou Enlai’s
insistence that “[China] shall only use peaceful means and shall not permit any other kinds of
methods” in resolving border issues (Maxwell 1995, 905). Additionally, a review of this conflict
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is relevant today since both India and China are emerging regional and aspiring hegemonic
powers. Thus, it is important to understand what brought these nations to war in the past in order
to anticipate the possibility of a reoccurrence, which would have greater implications due to their
growing power. Using Kenneth Waltz’s systems level of analysis method, it will be argued that a
neorealist systemic level analysis best explains the factors that pushed both nations to war in
1962, while accounting for the constraints that limited the conflict in scope and scale.
Sino-Indian Relations 1950-1959
The Sino-Indian relationship from 1950 to 1959 was particularly warm, and several reasons
for these cordial relations existed. Arguably the most important was the hasty diplomatic
recognition of the PRC in December 1949 by India, making them the second nation in the world
after Burma to do so (Vertzberger 1984, 63). This conferment of legitimacy was helpful in
establishing a cooperative environment with China, as many nations chose instead to recognize
the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Furthermore, India’s existence as a socialist and not a
capitalist state, allowed for greater cooperation with the PRC since they did not come into direct
conflict with Maoist ideology like the U.S. This basis of diplomatic and ideological congruency
led Prime Minister Nehru to attempt to revolutionize international affairs by producing the
Panchsheel Agreement between China and India in 1954. The Panchsheel Agreement stressed
five points; (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual
non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs; (4) equality and mutual
benefit, and finally; (5) peaceful coexistence (Eekelen 1967, 38). This agreement originates from
Nehru’s optimism that post-colonial nations could invalidate the precepts of a bipolar world, and
that the regional powers of Asia can contradict the validity of traditional balance of power
politics.
The diplomatic and ideological reasons for Sino-Indian cooperation are bolstered by shared
historical experiences. Both China and India share a long and uninterrupted cultural and
historical tradition. Both nations at one time were great powers. Most importantly though, both
nations were invaded by Western imperialists and consummately humiliated and exploited. This
occupation and exploitation by the West caused the growth of significant nationalist forces
within India and China, and the desire to gain independence. The ROC received its independence
in 1912, and the later consolidation of the PRC in 1949 ushered in a new era of Chinese
sovereignty and independence from imperialism. Likewise, India achieved its independence from
Britain in 1947.
Due to their history of Western occupation, China and India had additionally failed to
develop independent industries. Their occupations meant that the Chinese and Indian economies
were still largely agrarian, and dependent on the import of finished goods. This led the Indian
government to implement a form of democratic socialism, while the PRC engaged in agrarian
based communism, or Maoism. Regardless of their system’s differences, both nations abhorred
capitalism creating an ideological common ground. Their common historical experience
produced a familiar perspective upon which Indian and Chinese policymakers could relate to one
another.
This environment of common history and diplomatic cooperation producing positive
relations would be challenged by the Chinese policy of taking back historical possessions. The
1950 invasion and takeover of Tibet by the PRC would begin to show strains in the relationship.
Trepidation over Tibet’s seizure by the PRC was based in the idea of a historical Indian-Tibetan
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relationship, but the Seventeen Points Agreement of May 1951 ironed out their differences with
India recognizing China’s historical sovereignty over Tibet while still preserving Indian
economic and social interests in Tibet. The agreement appeared to settle a possible dispute over
Tibet between the two powers, but right-wing elements in the Indian parliament expressed this
viewpoint of the PRC invasion, “the final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is a little short
of perfidy” (Vertzberger 1984, 64). This underlying opinion of the Tibet invasion by the PRC
would bring forward another issue heightening tension in the relationship.
This issue was the definition of China’s border with India in the Northeast and Northwest.
Maxwell argues that one of China’s diplomatic priorities was defining diplomatically agreed
boundaries, as “boundaries are one of the first expressions of a modern state” and the PRC
sought this validation of modernity (Maxwell 1995, 905). However, to not endanger Sino-Indian
relations over the border question, Nehru and Zhou Enlai agreed to leave the border issue
between mid-level bureaucrats to be mediated at a later date paving the way for the 1954
Panchsheel Agreement (Hoffmann 1990, 32). Thus, this issue remained on the back-burner of
Indian foreign policy until the PRC began to make moves towards its historical conception of
Sino-Indian boundaries south of the McMahon Line in 1957.
Two years later Tibet rose up in a massive revolt against Chinese authority. China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved in to put down the rebellion by breaking popular will in
the capital of Lhasa. March 31, 1959 the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet into India where he was
granted political asylum. This course of events angered the Indian public as they saw it as a
renunciation of Indian trade and cultural access to Tibet guaranteed in the Seventeen Points
Agreement (Vertzberger 1984, 65). PRC officials chaffed at India’s meddling in their domestic
affairs by granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and thereby violating the 1954 Panchsheel
agreement (Hoffmann 1990, 64). The Tibetan revolt combined with gradual Chinese assertion of
borders in 1957 due to diplomatic impasse, are the primary factors contributing to a hostile SinoIndian diplomatic relationship from 1959 to the outbreak of hostilities.
Origin and Events Leading to Border Dispute
The 1914 Simla Convention between Britain and Tibet established the McMahon Line as the
official border between British India and China, denying the right of Chinese suzerainty over
Tibet (Dalvi 1969, 11). However, the line’s namesake McMahon, was ordered back to London in
disgrace over the “chicanery” he exercised in border negotiations in which he presented a
different map to the Chinese envoy, thus distancing Britain from the legitimacy of the negotiated
border (Maxwell 1995, 907). Thirty years later British cartographers began drawing the
McMahon Line as the border between British India and China, thus reviving the lines legal
legitimacy.
When India gained its independence from Britain in 1947 it inherited all of the British
territorial agreements, and as such inherited the McMahon Line as the border between it and
China. Indian belief in the legitimacy of the McMahon line dated back to the Simla Convention
of 1914, as well as to the numerous maps of British India with the line delineating its northern
border. As such Nehru shrugged off Chinese insistence in border negotiation during the 1954
agreement stating that “the McMahon line marked their border with China, where was the need”
(Varma 1965, 28)? Despite India’s view of the McMahon Line’s legitimacy, China had not
signed the Simla Convention and under no circumstances consented to any bilateral agreement
between Tibet and Britain because it violated their sovereignty (Gupta 1971, 523).
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Indian intransigence on negotiating a border acceptable to both parties led the PRC to act
independently in areas south of the McMahon line. The justification for this was that in the
absence of mutually negotiated borders, the true national boundary was a line of actual control
represented by the extent of either nation’s ability to administrate the territory. Practical assertion
of this idea was first revealed to India in 1957 when an Indian patrol discovered an all-weather
road which had been constructed in the Aksai-Chin Plain connecting Xinjiang and Tibet
(Vertzberger 1984, 65). The Indian government launched diplomatic protests asserting a
violation of their territorial integrity; however the PRC “considered [Aksai-Chin] to have long
been Chinese territory” (Maxwell 1995, 911). This issue was not resolved as the Indian
government refused to engage in territorial negotiations until Chinese forces completely
withdrew from the Aksai-Chin Plain. The PRC refused to do so, and instead of a diplomatic
solution India began to pursue a more confrontational approach to assert their territorial claims.
The rebellion in Tibet helped to drastically sour relations between the PRC and India, but
the border dispute widened due to a change in Indian military strategy. This change in military
strategy was to create forward-posts behind the Chinese claim line, and in strategic locations to
flank Chinese military positions (Hoffmann 1990, 94). These posts were constructed to assert
Indian territorial claims in the Ladakh region and to threaten the Xinjian-Tibet road in AksaiChin. By September, 1962 a similar series of forward posts had been built beyond the Chinese
claim line in Tibet, and four such posts were built even beyond the McMahon Line (Hoffmann
1990, 109). This resulted in an inability to claim that these posts were simply to defend Indian
territorial integrity. The territorial dispute from India’s perspective, coupled with the building of
forward military posts by the Indian military caused the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement to not be
renewed in 1961. Crossing both the claim and McMahon lines, both nations were in violation of
each other’s territorial conception, and India was now physically challenging Chinese
sovereignty in Tibet.
Defining the Systems Theory
Now that a historical context for Sino-Indian relations during the 20th Century has been
established, it is necessary to define the systemic level theory from which the case will be
analyzed. A systemic level of analysis eschews the individualities of states and the impact of
individual leaders on foreign policy outcomes. Instead it focuses on the structure of the
international system, and how this structure forces states to conform to a set of probable
responses regardless of their individual differences.
In Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, Man the State and War, he lays down the foundation for
a levels-of-analysis framework for studying international relations. Waltz does not contend to
have created this framework, but instead argues that different theories of international relations
promote one or another level of analysis over the other. The basis of this assertion is in Waltz’s
take on how is politics best to be studied, “Can man in society best be understood by studying
man or by studying society” (2001, 5)? If one believes that man in society can best be understood
by studying man then you will focus on individuals and reject the influence of society on them,
and vice versa. This idea is then refocused from the question of man and politics to the question
of why states go to war.
Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau believe that war is driven essentially by the natural
evilness of man. Essentially the “ubiquity of evil in human action arising from man’s
ineradicable lust for power and transforming churches into political organizations …revolutions
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into dictatorships… love for country into imperialism” (Waltz 2001, 24). From this perspective,
society and government are not influential forces in history, but instead magnifiers of mans
collective malevolence when grouped into nations. From a classical model states cannot
cooperate because “passion often obscures the true interests of states as of men,” and not because
“states are never honorable and peaceful” (Waltz 2001, 25). Waltzian neo-realism departs from
these ideas by exploring the other half of the question. Believing that “Man is born and in his
natural condition remains neither good nor bad,” but is influenced by society to one extreme or
the other, as states are influenced by a society of states (the international arena) to engage in war
or not (Waltz 2001, 5).
Neorealist systems theory is driven by one primary characteristic: in no matter what form
the system is structured, the system is driven by the essential existence of anarchy. The source of
this anarchy is the absence of an overarching international body with the power to force the
conformity of the units of the structure (the states). As such the United Nations and other
international organizations are not important and have no bearing on the system since they lack
the capability of shaping the unit actors decisions. Acknowledging this, states are the only
relevant actors, and the anarchic system leaves them with two realities. The first is that states are
responsible for their own security, and secondly that threats to this security are unending (Waltz
2008, 59).
Additionally, neo-realism departs from classical realism in that classical realists view power
itself as the ultimate goal of the state, whereas neorealists view power as a means with the end
being security (Waltz 2008, 57). Peace in an anarchic system is fragile, and therefore each state
must provide for its own security. However, providing for one’s own security through military
power or alliances often times undermines the security of neighboring states. This paradox where
increasing a states security undermines the perception of security in another state is known as the
“security dilemma,” and is a major structural explanation for the outbreak of war. This is due to
the fact that one can never be certain if additional security measures are defensive or offensive in
the anarchic system. Another cause on the systemic level for the outbreak of war is the failure of
deterrence. Deterrence strategy implies a buildup of military force adequate enough in perception
or reality to prevent a state from threatening another states security. If any state misperceives the
deterrent capability of another, or believes it has a greater offensive capability war is likely to
break out.
In addition to these universal characteristics of the systemic structure is the variable concept
of how power in the international system is actually divided. In the period of the Sino-Indian war
the world was locked in a bipolar balance of power led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In a
bipolar system states are rigidly aligned to either pole, but states in each camp have great
flexibility of strategy. This was caused by the zero-sum nature of a bipolar system, in that the
gain of one side is the loss of the other. As such, the leader of either faction is unwilling to allow
client members to fail in policy endeavors. Finally, in a bipolar system states that refuse to join
either faction drastically increase their security dilemma unless they have the power to challenge
the international structure towards a multi-polar balance. Now that the neorealist systemic level
theory is defined it shall be applied to explain the variables causing the outbreak of the SinoIndian war.
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International Variables Leading to Conflict: India
The three main variables motivating Indian behavior towards conflict with China on the
systemic level are: Indian national interests, the system’s influence on Indian behavior through
structural constraints, and the relationship between Indian perception of the international
structure and reality. To begin a systemic explanation of India’s actions we must first identify its
national interests, as it is what drives Indian action throughout the international structure.
According to neorealist thought the primary end of all states is security. This being the case, not
only is security the primary Indian national interest, but any issue relating to national security
becomes a primary interest.
Official borders, and their enforcement is a primary interest of each state for obvious
reasons. However, in the Indian case this issue takes on greater importance than it otherwise
would for other nations. This can be attributed to two factors. The most prevalent factor was that
India bordered a nation which not only questioned the legitimacy of the established border, but
also violated it. The second factor is the modern international system is formed by the interaction
of nation-states, which as defined by the Westphalian system are the only entities capable of
legitimately exercising sovereignty.
A key component of nation-state status under the Westphalian system is the existence of
demarcated and respected borders. These borders represent the extent of national sovereignty and
define where each nation’s authority begins and ends. The questioning of India’s established
border by China undermines both Indian sovereignty and security. Security is undermined first
by the direct military and administrative challenge to Indian territory, and second by
delegitimizing India’s position as a nation-state. If India can neither defend nor define borders
respected by other nations, other states may begin to question their position as a nation-state in
the system and then their sovereignty. This was a chief concern for India as they regarded the
Chinese threat to their border as one compromising their “independence, self-determination, and
position as a great power in Asia” (Vertzberger 1984, 67).
Another issue of national security relating to Indian interests was defense of the McMahon
Line. Two key issues aided the creation of security dilemma situation along the McMahon Line.
The first was the discovery of the Chinese road connecting Xinjiang and Tibet through the
Aksai-Chin area in 1957. The second was the imposition of martial law on Tibet in 1959 by the
PLA. China argued that completion of the road southeast of the McMahon Line in Aksai-Chin
was simply the reestablishment of a historical commerce route from Xinjiang to Tibet (Eekelen
1967, 110). This road not only represented a blatant Chinese violation of India’s McMahon Line
border, but it also caused armed tension in the region. Shortly after the roads discovery, PLA
frontier guards began patrolling the Aksai-Chin region, but never more than 20km away from the
road’s location (Hoffmann 1990, 77). The issue of the road in Aksai-Chin and the PLA’s role in
Tibet in 1959 became linked since the majority of Chinese troops entered Tibet via the road from
Xinjiang.
The surge of PLA soldiers into Tibet aroused suspicions of a forcible border assertion by the
PRC. These tensions were heightened by the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa, and the
closure of Tibet to commercial and cultural access by India, guaranteed in the 1951 treaty.
Defensive maneuvers or not, these activities created a security dilemma along the border as India
felt that Tibet was “essential for mastery over South Asia, and the most economical method for
guaranteeing India's security” (Garver 2006, 93). Forced to account for increasing Chinese
military power near or past the McMahon Line, India responded by deploying their military in
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forward positions along the border with China as early as 1960. Accounting for India’s national
interest with force posturing, they attempted to both affirm the legitimacy of the McMahon Line
as a border and to account for the security dilemma created by the hardening of PLA positions in
Tibet and Aksai-Chin.
The second way a systemic level analysis accounts for the 1962 war is the manner in which
India’s policy was defined by the structure of the international system. In looking at the
geostrategic positioning of India within the system, it is immediately apparent that they
attempted to remain neutral or unaligned in the bipolar structure. India remained a powerful
enough state to deter the third world adventurism of either bloc within its territory, but weak
enough to be challenged by hostile neighbors. An excellent example of this was the persistent
threat of Pakistan on their Northwestern border. The poor relationship of Pakistan and India is
rooted in domestic level variables, but a systemic level cause was a disputed claim over the
sovereignty of Kashmir. Both sides claim the right to sovereignty over Kashmir, and this has
resulted in a heavily armed border. Additionally, appearances of a Sino-Pakistani agreement to
hem in India developed with Chinese diplomatic overtures to Pakistan for peaceful border
settlement beginning in 1961 (Dalvi 1969, 42-47). This forced India to take a hard-line stance in
their border dispute with China out of fear that concessions would show weakness, and endanger
their control of Kashmir in a Domino-Theory type logic train.
Another structural element of the international system was the existence of nuclear
weapons. Nuclear weapons invalidated traditional calculations of deterrence, and thus the great
powers were those whom possessed them. In India’s regional calculations neither themselves,
nor did any other surrounding nations possess nuclear weapons keeping intact the use of
deterrence as a method of securing or defending interests. This being the case, the option of
engaging in armed conflict with surrounding nations remained possible as long as in India’s
force calculations they were superior to their target. A prime example of India’s employment of
force to further interests was their invasion of Portuguese controlled Goa on December 17, 1961
(Eekelen 1967, 75). This use of force to assert sovereignty over perceived territory is an
excellent precedent for the October 9, 1962 offensive against the PLA in Ladakh. Force against
PLA incursions remained off the table as long as the Indian military believed their strategic
position and capabilities to be inferior to the Chinese. Returning from a 1960 diplomatic tour of
the U.S., Nehru expressed the idea that due to Soviet and Western military aid, “the military
balance had changed in favor of India” (Eekelen 1967, 109). Thus in the absence of nuclear
weapons, India disregarded the Chinese effort at deterrence and employed the use of force to
settle their territorial claims.
Finally, it is necessary to point out how India’s perception of the international system, which
differed from reality, influenced their decision to employ force against the PRC. India perceived
the international system as open to change from a bipolar to a multi-polar structure. This was
based in their success of remaining unaligned to either bloc, while still receiving significant
military and economic aid from both camps. Given India’s strategic geographic position in the
system, both superpowers sought to gain the allegiance of India to their side through the use of
aid. Understanding this, India played both sides against each other, and assumed that either
superpower would be willing to intervene on their behalf in the event of Sino-Indian hostilities
for pragmatic and alliance building reasons. Thus, India viewed its use of force as a no lose
situation. Either the force would succeed in attaining their national interests, or if Indian power
proved to be inadequate, “the superpowers would intervene to prevent any large-scale war
between India and China;” therefore, bailing out India from a potential catastrophe (Vertzberger
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1984, 101). This perception of Indian value to either superpower and the general misperception
of the international system would cost them.
Ultimately the Indians failed to acknowledge that while the interests of the superpowers may
partially depend on India’s well being, the system is ultimately in anarchy and each nation is
responsible for assuring their own security. Additionally, India had miscalculated both the
willingness and ability of the superpowers to intervene on their behalf. In reality the Soviet
Union could not exercise restraint on Chinese actions or compel them to drop the border issue.
The Sino-Soviet split had not yet occurred, but its origin is in the late 1950’s, and the attempt to
restrain PRC actions towards India was a contributing factor in the decline of Soviet influence
(Vertzberger 1984, 92). Indian belief in U.S. intervention was based on a miscalculation of U.S.
interests in Asia, as well as willingness to repel PRC advance based on the Domino Theory.
While the U.S. intervened in Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina, India overlooked the essential
element common to each. This element was the inability of each nation to resist communist
advance on its own. In this case, the projected image of Indian power was a liability. The
realities of the international system and its anarchic nature would ensure that their decision to use
force would not be consequence free. Now the Chinese causes for war will be evaluated at the
systemic level.
International Variables Leading to Conflict: China
The systemic level variables motivating China towards conflict, like in India, revolved
around Chinese national interests, the system’s influence on Chinese behavior through structural
constraints, and the role of anarchy in the system. Because of the anarchic structure of the
international system, China is no different than India and state security must be its prime end.
China’s membership in the communist bloc does not grant it any guarantee of protection, and
therefore its national interests are calculated in ways of maximizing national security. As such
we shall discuss the three main interests affected by the border dispute with India.
As in India’s case, the delineation of official borders for the PRC was a prime interest in
order to gain legitimacy in the international system. This legitimacy is rooted within the
conventions of the Westphalian system, where borders are paramount as they define the extent of
sovereignty and political self-determination. The PRC’s inheritance of territory which was
divided by Western imperialists had a strong legal and pragmatic interest in negotiating
legitimate borders with its neighbors. The basis of Chinese territorial definition was on the extent
of historical holdings, but the PRC had determined in 1950 to negotiate borders based off the
alignments they had inherited (Maxwell 1995, 905). This meant that China would not bog itself
down in unreasonable claims in Indochina or other areas of traditional imperial suzerainty. This
mentality guided border settlement by peaceful means with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Mongolia, Cambodia, and Laos (Maxwell 1995, 905). Peaceful settlement of the
Sino-Indian border however, was not possible due to Indian unwillingness to negotiate based on
the perceived legitimacy of the McMahon Line (Hoffmann 1990, 71).
A second national interest challenged by the border dispute with India was the Chinese right
to non-intervention of foreigners in their domestic affairs. This principle of domestic sanctity
from outside interference is also one of the rights of states in the Westphalian system. Chinese
security was undermined by India’s role in manipulating domestic events in both Tibet and in
Ladakh. The Indian military’s establishment of forward posts and patrols of the Ladakh region,
beginning in 1960, was direct interference in Chinese domestic areas. While it was true China
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did not have legal sovereignty over the Ladakh area due to its position south of the McMahon
Line, that argument remains moot as international boundaries must be agreed upon at least
bilaterally, and the PRC gave it no such recognition (Cukwurah 1967, 159). Furthermore,
Ladakh, and more importantly the Aksai-Chin plain was a strategically important tract of land
connecting Xinjiang and Tibet.
Indian interference in Tibet after the 1959 uprising was also taken as a direct violation of
domestic sanctity, and a challenge to Chinese security and interests. The PRC became aware of
Indian efforts to covertly aid the Dalai Lama and Tibetan separatists shortly after the PLA moved
in to suppress the uprising. In fact, India had gone so far as to allow the CIA bases of operation
along the border for a covert campaign in Tibet from 1957 to 1961 (Garver 2006, 97).
Furthermore, a series of four Indian military bases were constructed and manned in Tibet north
of the McMahon Line. These actions illustrated India’s desire to keep Tibet as a buffer state, and
recognize Chinese suzerainty instead of sovereignty in the region, thus directly challenging
China’s security.
The Chinese interest of maintaining a secure border with India was also threatened by the
border dispute. Reinforcement of Tibet after 1959, the Aksai-Chin road way, and Chinese
military patrols of the border were an attempt to maintain their territorial integrity. This added
military presence created a security dilemma for India, and they began building up and
strengthening their own military capacity near contested areas. The adoption of a forward Indian
military policy in 1960, coupled with Indian scouting patrols across the border and the
construction of military posts around Ladakh and Tibet severely undermined Chinese border
security. This led to the PLA “digging in” around contested border areas and effectively
militarizing the border.
China’s response to the Indian military buildup as well as their covert programs in contested
border areas was constrained by the structure of the international environment. A major
constraining force on Chinese action was the geostrategic situation in Asia during the late
1950’s. Beginning in 1950 with the Korean War, the major battles of the Cold War were fought
in Asia in the West’s effort to contain the communist bloc. The PRC had to contend with antiChinese forces in South Korea, a U.S. backed ROC in Taiwan, a U.S.-fortified Japan, and
increasing U.S. involvement in Indochina by 1960. These numerous threats on China’s Western
front were significant, and severely limited their maneuverability in other areas of concern.
Unbeknownst to the West, the PRC was increasingly unable to depend on the support of the
communist bloc due to increasing belligerence from the U.S.S.R. on various diplomatic and
territorial issues. The Soviets pressured the PRC to acknowledge Indian border claims, and SinoSoviet relations strained under their own border issues (Vertzberger 1984, 88).
Acknowledging the limiting effects of these security threats on Chinese military power, the
PRC advocated a policy of peaceful border settlement. China used this policy to its advantage
and scored a critical victory in neutralizing a potential Pakistani threat to their security interests
by a warming of relations. The geostrategic environment in which the PRC found itself was one
of being surrounded by a ring of hostile states. Indian diplomatic intransigence on border issues
and known subversion in Tibet added another threat in that ring. Thus, the structure of the
international environment drove the PRC to rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests against
minor powers in order to preserve its military power for guarding its borders against larger
threats. This situation explains a seemingly coincidental rapprochement in relations with
Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, while Sino-Indian relations simultaneously deteriorated in 1959.
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This hostile geostrategic environment ruled out the option of using military force to settle
the border dispute with India because of the potential pitfall of starting a two front war. Thus
PRC actions along the Indian border were limited by the international structure to defensive
posturing, deterrence, and entrenchment. This is illustrated by the numerous Chinese overtures to
Indian representatives to keep patrols 20km behind each border (Eekelen 1967, 92-111).
Rapprochement with Pakistan was pragmatic in the freedom of action the PRC gained by not
needing to guard the Sino-Pakistani border heavily. Therefore, Chinese policy was constrained
by the system to not initiate force against India in order to settle the border dispute, but instead to
bolster its defenses. However, the PRC declared that “force would be met with force” on the
border issue, and this is evidenced by the PLA counter offensives launched on October 20 and
November 16, 1962 (Maxwell 1995, 905).
Finally, the anarchy present in the international system played a significant role in the
actions of the PRC on the border issue. Unlike their Indian counterparts, China properly assessed
the international situation and never lost sight of the fact that only China could assure Chinese
security. The emerging Sino-Soviet split was a key element in the PRC’s unwillingness to rely
on outside support for their interests. Not only did the Soviets urge China to a settlement counter
to their interests, but they openly aided India in both the construction of a domestic MIG
program and a pledge to help them develop nuclear energy (Vertzberger 1984, 87).
Simultaneously, Soviet aid to China was severely cut including assistance in developing a
nuclear program. Clearly a common Soviet-Sino communist ideology was unimportant to their
“allies,” as they even ventured to grant India great power status through nuclear development.
In addition to the Soviet military aid was U.S. support of India in the form of agricultural
assistance and millions in financial aid packages. Although India pledged neutrality, the PRC
clearly believed that they were in the West’s bloc. Indian based CIA operations into Tibet and
India’s role in the Korean War helped bolster this perception. Unable to rely on either
superpower for protection or intervention on their behalf, the PRC assessed that any military
movements in securing the border would have to be proportional, decisive, and most importantly
retaliatory. This assessment was gained from a rational calculation of the potential geostrategic
and political consequences of a PLA initiation of force. While neither the PRC nor India
possessed nuclear weapons, they feared a PLA offensive into India would be interpreted by the
West as communist advance and therefore provoke a nuclear response. In the wake of the
Taiwan Straits Crisis, and keeping in mind Sino-Soviet agitation, China was unwilling to risk a
potential nuclear strike from the West, especially without full Soviet support. This being the
case, China resolved that its armed response to Indian aggression would be purely political. The
PRC would paint itself as the victim of aggression, but would then unleash a massive but
calculated counterattack to force diplomatic concessions by India on the border issue, thereby
resolving the issue once and for all (Eekelen 1967, 191-192). While the systems level of analysis
plainly explains both the motives and limitations of India and China leading to the Sino-Indian
War, it is contended that the model overlooks key motivations of either state leading to conflict.
Alternative Explanations of Conflict: Domestic Level Analysis
A valid criticism of a systemic level approach to explaining conflict is that it overlooks key
variables and differences between states in the assumption that all states are equal due to
constraints that the structure of the international system places upon them. Singer argues that at
this level of analysis “actors are characterized and their behavior predicted in relatively gross and
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general terms” (Singer 1961, 82). To account for the generalization of state behavior inherent in
a systemic level analysis a brief domestic level analysis explaining the Sino-Indian war will be
attempted. Based on Vertberger’s literature review on the subject, my domestic level analysis
will be limited to the most influential domestic variable driving China and India to war;
ideological and political considerations (Vertzberger 1984, 70).
Indian ideological and political causes for war centered on the belief in non-alignment as a
viable alternative to the bipolar system. The source of Indian non-aligned thought was that the
Cold War was a conflict between the imperialist Western nations, and therefore newly
independent former colonies had no reason or interest in siding with their former masters. The
Indians by remaining non-aligned, hoped to establish a third pole of power in the international
system organized by the nations of the Third World. This third bloc of nations would fight for
issues that really mattered to them such as ending colonialism, racial discrimination, and raising
living standards in the developing world (Eekelen 1967, 4). Nehru envisioned that this Third
World bloc would act as an arbiter in the West’s conflict, thereby gaining both moral authority
and legitimacy.
In concert with the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Sino-Indian Panchsheel
Agreement, Nehru hoped to expand his concept of non-alignment into a full-blown panAsianism movement (Vertzberger 1984, 98). This pan-Asianism was based in the common
historical experience of colonialism that these nations shared, but Nehru failed to account for
historical differences and regional rivalries. Nehru asserted that, “the basic challenge in
Southeast Asia is between India and China,” but he forgot this reality in supporting an Asian
solidarity bloc. Nehru, and India’s conception of a non-aligned third world was based on not
only its viability, but that India would be both the natural and unchallenged leader of such a
group. Traditional Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in Asia challenged Indian thinking as China
asserted its right to be the leader of such a group. The need to exert its regional great power
status over China led to diplomatic intransigence on the issue of border negotiations. Thus, India
saw Chinese dispute of border areas to be a political challenge to their right to lead Asia, and in
turn pushed backed in order to show strength.
Chinese ideological and political causes for war centered on the belief that its Maoist
interpretation of communist revolution was not only correct, but purer than the Soviet model.
This dispute on the merits of Maoism over Leninism was focused squarely on the Soviet Union’s
insistence on backing the Indian position in the border dispute through political and military aid.
The PRC challenged Soviet actions on three points; that their diplomatic position showed a lack
of solidarity with a fellow communist nation, that Soviet support of a bourgeoisie regime in India
would not forward the goal of communist revolution, and that India wasn’t truly non-aligned but
in fact in league with the imperialists (Eekelen 1967, 177-182). Soviet military aid inflamed the
PRC, especially in light of Soviet cuts to Chinese aid, because it appeared as if the Soviets were
turning their backs on a Marxist brother. Furthermore, the PRC believed that only through
struggle and challenge, not foreign aid, could they achieve the end of global Marxist revolution.
Finally, Indian overtures to the West for aid, and their assistance to the West in fomenting
problems on China’s border led the PRC on a quest to convince the Soviets that they were being
used. The PRC concluded that superior PLA military forces and position in the region would
force the Indians to rely on Western intervention to bail them out in the event of hostilities
(Vertzberger 1984, 91). This would both expose the Indians as true imperialists, and score an
ideological victory against the Soviet Union in the enlarging diplomatic split (Eekelen 1967,
178).
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The domestic level analysis contends that it is domestic differences between states that drive
them towards conflict. Examining the most influential domestic factors (according to scholars on
the subject) on Chinese and Indian decision making leading to the 1962 war, it seems as if
ideology had differing levels of importance for each nation. Indian ideology and their belief in
leading a pan-Asian bloc nationalized tensions with China, creating a zero-sum game. If the
Indian’s backed down they would seem weak, and to avoid this they took a non-compromising
stand on border issues. In China, Maoist ideology was more so an issue with hierarchy within the
Soviet bloc than with Indian recalcitrance on border issues. The PRC actively believed the
Indians not to be non-aligned, but this was not important as ideologically they did not pose a
threat to the Chinese communist system. As such, Chinese ideology was not as important in
crafting policy, and Zhou Enlai was able to take a pragmatic stand. As Singer points out the
overgeneralization of a systemic analysis, he also points out that a domestic analysis suffers from
the same weakness but instead an undue focus on state differences (Singer 1961, 83). The
domestic analysis helps us better understand the importance of the border issue in each nation’s
context, but in this case it does not adequately explain the actions undertaken by either regime.
Furthermore, only with a systemic level analysis can we explore the limitation on action caused
by the international structure on each state. Ultimately, Chinese ideology does not explain why
they did not take the offensive to oust India as imperialists, or why India decided to change its
military policy towards an aggressive forward base strategy. Therefore, a systemic level analysis
is more suited to explaining the actions leading to the Sino-Indian War.
Conclusion
While valid alternative theoretical models explaining the causes for war exist, a neorealist
systems-level analysis best explains the factors leading India and China to war in 1962. Keeping
in mind the historical context of generally cordial Sino-Indian relations prior to 1959 it seems
unlikely that solely ideological differences drove the two nations to war. If ideology was such an
important motivator behind the militarization of the Sino-Indian border dispute, then it is
unlikely conflict would have waited to develop until 1962. Additionally, if Sino-Indian rivalry
for dominance in Asia was so virulent why did India recognize PRC sovereignty in Tibet in
1951, and later agree to a mutual treaty of peaceful coexistence in 1954? A domestic level
analysis cannot account for these otherwise amicable diplomatic relations.
What a systemic level analysis reveals is certain changes in national interests, geostrategic
positions, and the anarchy of the international system brought both nations closer to the precipice
of conflict. Various actions and reactions by both nations along the border created a security
dilemma for each, and this brought the border dispute to the forefront of Sino-Indian relations.
Furthermore, India believed they had the power to reshape the international system from a
bipolar to multi-polar world. Their lack of either nuclear capability or significant conventional
power exposed their status as simply a minor power of strategic importance in the international
system. Thus either superpower was only motivated to preserve their security so long as it was in
their interests to do so, and not as an ultimate necessity contrary to Indian belief. The ultimate
cause for war in 1962 was India’s assertion that it was a major power in world affairs. China’s
incentive in limiting their defeat of the Indian military was motivated by their interest in delegitimizing the McMahon Line and consolidating their sovereignty in Tibet (Guang 2005, 503).
The systems level analysis reveals not only what urged each nation to war, but also explains how
the anarchy of the system limited the extent of the fighting.
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Figure-1 (Eekelen 1967, XIII)
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